Memory is not a necessary condition for personhood, since during their lives, human beings witness or are the agents of many events of which they have no recollection at later moments of time. Neither is memory a sufficient condition for personal identity, according to Reid, since even though someone may be able to remember episodically that he was the agent or the witness of an event, it is not his remembering the event that makes it the case that he himself is the same person he was then. Memory gives someone immediate knowledge of a past event that person was the witness to or agent of, but it does not ensure that that person was actually there at the time of the event.
Due to this feature of identity, there is no way to think that mental states and processes remain identical over time:. Hence we may infer, that identity cannot, in its proper sense, be applied to our pains, our pleasures, our thoughts, or any operation of our minds. The pain felt this day is not the same individual pain which I felt yesterday, though they may be similar in kind and degree, and have the same cause.
The same may be said of every feeling, and of every operation of the mind: They are all successive in their nature like time itself, no two moments of which can be the same moment. Thus, Reid thinks that persons should not be identified with their thoughts or feelings, but with the subject of such thoughts and feelings, which remains the same over time. The fourth Essay is dedicated to conception, whose primary role is to be an ingredient or concomitant in all other operations of the mind.
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In this picture, conception is being used as part of the endeavor to gain knowledge of the external world when it is employed by the senses , of the internal world when it is employed by consciousness , and also to analyze the complex relationships that exist among the objects of the world, among numbers in mathematics, and among rules of reasoning in logic.
As such, conception is a faculty that acts as a bridge, connecting the information gathered by the senses with the intellectual processing powers of judgment and reasoning. Since conception is a simple operation of the mind, it cannot be subjected to a reductive definition any more than the other operations can be. Our senses cannot give us the belief of any object, without giving some conception of it at the same time: No man can either remember or reason about things of which he hath no conception: When we will to exert any of our active powers, there must be some conception what we will to do: There can be no desire or aversion, love nor hatred, without some conception of the object: We cannot feel pain without conceiving it, though we can conceive it without feeling it.
These things are self-evident. EIP IV. As already pointed out, the argument that sensations must be intentional, and hence take themselves as objects, is based on this idea that every operation of the mind has conception as an ingredient. The passage quoted above can indeed be read as saying that one must conceive of the pain one is feeling at a given moment of time in order to actually be able to feel it. In this interpretation, conception should be understood as the operation that allows beings endowed with this faculty to get acquainted with an object, be that object something that exists in the present, existed in the past, or will never exist.
On the other side of this controversy are those authors who point out that it is rather counter-intuitive to believe that conception does not operate via concepts—after all, the name might be indicative of something here. The role of conception, as an ingredient in all the other operations of the human mind, is to allow humans to secure a mental grip on something. Such a mental grip is secured by deploying a singular concept, understood to be something like a uniquely identifying definite description.
In this interpretation, a being would not be able to have a sensation, a perception, or a memory unless it was able to deploy a singular concept, a uniquely identifying definite description isolating that thing in the world. One of the most interesting features of bare conception is its ability to be used to think about objects without any heed being paid to their existence or non-existence, and also about propositions, without any judgment of their truth or falsity.
In bare conception there can neither be truth nor falsehood, because it neither affirms nor denies. Every judgment, and every proposition by which judgment is expressed, must be true or false; and the qualities of true and false, in their proper sense, can belong to nothing but to judgments, or to propositions which express judgment.
In the bare conception of a thing there is no judgment, opinion, or belief included, and therefore it cannot be either true or false.
Bare conception seems to require the mind of the conceiver to use certain concepts—simple terms—to bring forth objects to the mind in a way in which conception, when employed as an ingredient in other operations of the human mind, does not. This should not be surprising, though: once someone is able to think about something, even when he is not perceiving or remembering it, his mind will have established a certain grasp of that thing, classified and analyzed it, such that he will be able to think about it without using any of his other faculties.
Ideas as acts of the mind. Bare conception can be understood by analogy with painting, Reid argues, but he warns us that analogous thinking can take us only so far. To unpack this further, let us think about the elements involved in conceiving that the sun is yellow, for instance. Reid argues that in this act of conception, there are the following three elements: a mind, an act of conception that the sun is yellow, and the thing itself—the sun—external to the mind in question.
Furthermore, he argues that there is something missing: an image in the mind, an additional representation, that has the explicit content of a yellow sun. He is willing to assert that this is just a verbal dispute, if everyone else is willing to agree with him that these images in the mind, or ideas, are nothing more than acts of conceiving—a moot point, given that everyone else was dead at the point when he was writing, and no one could have agreed with him.
But, in effect, this is a serious conceptual point. The analogy with painting should help classify conceptions into three classes, according to Reid. Our conceptions, therefore, appear to be of three kinds: They are either the conceptions of individual things, the creatures of God; or they are conceptions of the meaning of general words; or they are the creatures of our own imagination. The first of these issues shows Reid to think that it is possible for fictional names to be used in the same way as regular names, even though the former category will be used to name nonexistents.
Centaurs, not centaur-inspired images or ideas, are the objects of such centaur thoughts. The only exception is constituted by a thought which is explicitly about a painting of a centaur, in which case it should be obvious to everyone that what is being conceived is an image, and not a mythological animal. This one object which I conceive [a centaur], is not the image of an animal, it is an animal. I know what it is to conceive an image of an animal, and what it is to conceive an animal; and I can distinguish the one of these from the other without any danger of mistake.
EIP , IV. Reid does not talk about different levels of existence; there is no doubt that centaurs do not exist as flesh-and-blood animals. It is important, however, to note that Reid ascribes intentionality to all the operations of the human mind, and this intentionality is to be resolved by understanding how conception works. However, in the course of his analysis of conception, it becomes clear that imagination is not exactly the same thing as conception. Any conception is of the imaginative kind when it is lively and about possible objects of sense. One consequence is that people can never be said to imagine universals, or propositions; neither are people supposed to think that anyone is imagining objects of sense, when they are actually perceiving them.
A different kind of conception is responsible for the proper workings of perception. Reid dedicates two essays to the mental powers of judgment and reasoning with which he believes human beings to be endowed by nature. Essay VI, the one dedicated to judgment, presents the main elements of what Reid takes to be the philosophy of common sense. After a general introduction, in which he describes the fundamental characteristics of judgment, Reid argues that certain principles should be taken for granted as true.
These are the first principles of common sense, which describe how the external and internal worlds work. These principles are self-evident and as such their truth cannot be demonstrated through any kind of reasoning. In the following essay, dedicated to reasoning, Reid argues that it is the purview of this faculty to produce judgments, or to combine and analyze them, in two main ways: deductively or probably. In what follows, these issues are discussed in turn, by first explaining what Reid thought about judgment, and then providing a schematic account of how deductive reasoning is supposed to be applied to the class of necessary truths, while probable reasoning is supposed to be applied to the class of contingent truths.
Reid talks about judging in terms of offering mental assent or dissent to the issues represented by any particular judgment. Reid thinks that if human beings were not endowed with such an operation, they would not be able to reason abstractly. Without analyzing, abstracting, and judging when they reached correct conclusions, human beings would have been given reasoning in vain:. EIP VI. Some authors argue that judging should not be understood as involving just mental affirming or denial of its content, since that would not distinguish judging from believing. Judgment, therefore, seems to presuppose belief.
Judgment, then, would simply be superfluous, while belief would be ubiquitous, either as a concomitant or an ingredient in all other operations of the human mind Rysiew : The man who perceives an object, believes that it exists, and is what he distinctly perceives it to be; nor is it in his power to avoid such judgment. And the like may be said of memory, and of consciousness. Whether judgment ought to be called a necessary concomitant of these operations, or rather a part or ingredient of them, I do not dispute. But it is certain, that all of them are accompanied with a determination that something is true or false, and a consequent belief.
If this determination be not judgment, it is an operation that has got no name; for it is not simple apprehension, neither is it reasoning; it is a mental affirmation or negation; it may be expressed by a proposition affirmative or negative, and it is accompanied with the firmest belief.
To save Reid from this inconsistency, some have argued that the distinctive character of judgment emerges not from his official characterization of this mental operation, but rather from his comparing it to an external, real-life tribunal. To wit, Reid thinks that common sense is that minimal degree of understanding that every adult human being possesses or should possess , such that he can function well in this world. Common sense is concerned only with propositions that express self-evident truths or falsehoods ; judgment, more generally, is concerned with propositions that express any other kinds of truths or falsehoods.
Reid believes that self-evident principles are at the foundation of any kind of knowledge and that common sense is the mental operation that discovers such principles for human beings:. All knowledge, and all science, must be built upon principles that are self-evident; and of such principles, every man who has common sense is a competent judge, when he conceives them distinctly. Hence it is, that disputes often terminate in an appeal to common sense. This suggests that Reid thinks that human beings are all endowed with a mental operation—common sense—that is meant to discover the first principles upon which any kind of science is built.
These first principles, when considered distinctly, namely in isolation from anything else, will be immediately found to be true, just as anything parading as a first principle, when considered distinctly, will be found to be false. No one undergoes a complicated reasoning procedure to discover the truth or falsehood of such principles; everyone just knows this, because, in being self-evident, these principles wear their truths conspicuously. In other words, what results from exercising the faculty of common sense is intuitive knowledge. Reid explains that reason and common sense do not conflict, because common sense is part of reason, just as judging does not oppose reason:.
We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. The first is to judge of things self-evident; the second to draw conclusions that are not self-evident from those that are. The first of these is the province, and the sole province of common sense; and therefore it coincides with reason in its whole extent, and is only another name for one branch or one degree of reasoning.
Reid thus believes that human beings are endowed with a faculty that gives them immediate knowledge of self-evident principles. This knowledge is not innate; after all, as an Empiricist, Reid thinks that all knowledge is acquired. The faculty of common sense, just like all the other original faculties, is innate, in the sense that they are part of the mental architecture of a human being.
The sense in which this intuitive knowledge is immediate, without it being innate is the following: once reasoning and the ability to process a human language are sufficiently developed, a human being will be able to know, non-inferentially, that certain propositions, when considered distinctly, are true. Reid calls such propositions first principles, and he argues that they can be divided into two classes: first principles of contingent truths, on the one hand, and first principles of necessary truth, on the other.
As Van Cleve points out, just because the former type of principles have contingent truths as their contents, this does not mean that the principles themselves are, in any way, less necessary than those of necessary truths. It is the truths themselves that are either necessary or contingent:.
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The truths that fall within the compass of human knowledge, whether they be self-evident, or deduced from those that are self-evident, may be reduced to two classes. They are either necessary and immutable truths, whose contrary is impossible, or they are contingent and mutable, depending upon some effect of will and power, which had a beginning, and may have an end. If the first principles of common sense are discovered by employing the operation of intuitive judging, reasoning proper is to be employed to discover whatever conclusions follow from self-evident principles.
Since there are two classes of first principles, Reid argues that there are two types of reasoning. Demonstrative reasoning is employed to draw conclusions that follow from the first principles of necessary truths, whereas probable reasoning is employed to draw conclusions that follow from the first principles of contingent truths EIP VII. The strength of demonstrative reasoning, which is commonly employed in mathematics and logic, is such that for showing that a conclusion follows from some axioms or first principles nothing else needs to be done other than offering one demonstration.
Reid thinks that it would be superfluous to try to give several different demonstrations to prove one conclusion, while employing demonstrative reasoning, even though a variety of proofs may be available in practice:. To add more demonstrations of the same conclusion, would be a kind of tautology in reasoning; because one demonstration, clearly comprehended, gives all the evidence we are capable of receiving.
The strength of probable reasoning …depends not upon any one argument, but upon many, which unite their force, and lead to the same conclusion. Any one of them by itself would be insufficient to convince; but the whole taken together may have a force that is irresistible, so that to desire more evidence would be absurd.
Probable reasoning is the method of choice for all the natural sciences, whose true propositions are contingent. According to Reid, probable reasoning comes in degrees, whereas demonstrative reasoning does not admit degrees; it is absolute. In every step of demonstrative reasoning, the inference is necessary, and we perceive it to be impossible that the conclusion should not follow from the premises. In probable reasoning, the connection between the premises and the conclusion is not necessary, nor do we perceive it to be impossible that the first should be true while the last is false.
Reid thinks that the vulgar is mistaken when contrasting probable reasoning with certainty. Hume, in the Treatise , argues that all knowledge should be reduced to probability, because human beings are fallible creatures, endowed with fallible faculties. Reid agrees with Hume in part: probable reasoning concerning cause and effect, for instance, is the result of an innate principle of human constitution.
Such a principle is known to be true, by intuition, and by exercising the faculty of common sense. But Reid also disagrees with Hume, and points out that probable reasoning concerning cause and effect is not merely a matter of custom. The relevant first principle of contingent truth allows human beings to be certain that effect follows its cause, not because they reason that it is so, but because they judge intuitively that it is so.
Contemporary philosophy of mind is mostly silent concerning the way human beings interact and appreciate works of art; the widespread belief seems to be that such issues belong to value theory rather than to the philosophy of mind proper. Reid, however, is part of a different tradition, which sought to explain the interest humans have in art and its artifacts, and consequently the interactions humans seek with said artifacts starting by observing human psychology.
As such, he, just like some of his predecessors for example, Hume , Hutcheson , and Shaftesbury , thinks that adult human beings are endowed with a special faculty, taste, which is supposed to help them appreciate beautiful or aesthetically relevant things, and disapprove those that are found to be lacking the sought-after qualities.
Reid is thus mostly describing and analyzing the aesthetic experience, rather than addressing issues that are relevant from the point of view of the philosophy of art. In the course of doing this, however, he is interested in questions pertaining to art and artworks. Reid has an expression theory of art, in that he is interested in how art can express emotion, or, better still, how artists can and do express emotions through an artistic medium.
If art is a sort of language, the faculty of taste, as applied to the aesthetic qualities of artworks, is the way to be made privy to this language: by employing this faculty, human beings become sensitive to the signs and decode their meaning. However, this is not the only way people employ their internal sense: by using this faculty they also become sensitive to the aesthetic qualities of the world.
One cannot gain complete knowledge of the external world, in this picture, unless one understands and appreciates the beauty of the world. To better understand this, consider the distinction that Reid draws between things internal and things external to the mind at the beginning of the EIP :.
When…we speak of things in the mind, we understand by this, things of which the mind is the subject. Excepting the mind itself, and things in the mind, all other things are said to be external. EIP I. This distinction is as elucidating as it is confusing: since both types of taste are operations of the mind, they both are, in a sense, internal.
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The objects that can be food and drink are external to the mind—they are physical things to be found in the world. Reid does not argue that other minds can be directly perceived, but he takes it to be a first principle of common sense that other minds exist the 8th first principle of contingent truths, EIP VI. This interpretation of natural signs is innate, since, Reid claims, even small children respond in the correct that is, expected way in the presence of an angry parent, for instance. Putting everything together, here is the picture that emerges: Reid believes that beauty is a property both of objects and of minds.
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Moreover, he thinks that beauty itself is both a primary and a secondary quality of objects. As in morals, in the domain of aesthetic value, Reid is an objectivist at least, according to Benbaji The aesthetic or internal taste has the dual role of discovering what material objects are beautiful, and, indirectly, what minds, which created those beautiful objects, are inherently beautiful. The internal taste is used to reach aesthetic judgments by evaluating material objects, which express the mental attributes of the artist.
Without excellence in the mind, no product of that mind can be perceived as beautiful. The internal taste functions very much like perception of external objects: certain signs of aesthetic qualities function to trigger a conception and belief in the existence of the aesthetic quality in question.
The internal taste is thus assimilated to the external sense of taste, since both senses are supposed to contribute to the perception of specific qualities of objects. Marina Folescu Email: folescum missouri. Sensation Reid argues that sensation is an original and simple operation of the mind, which for him means not only that certain beings namely sentient ones are born with an ability to sense, but also that this operation of the mind cannot be logically defined. Perception Perception is the main faculty that has the role to give beings endowed with this faculty brute knowledge about the external world: the knowledge is brute because no reasoning enters perception; and the result is knowledge, even though sometimes when the perceiver believes that something is being perceived, something is actually being either perceptually illusioned or hallucinated.
Reid argues that: [A] requisite to our knowing things by signs is, that the appearance of the sign to the mind, be followed by the conception and belief of the thing signified. However, Reid himself draws a distinction between these two types of properties of objects: There appears to be a real foundation for the distinction, and it is this: That our senses give us a direct and distinct notion of the primary qualities, and inform us what they are in themselves: But of the secondary qualities, our senses give us only a relative and obscure notion.
Acquired Perception Acquired perception is distinguished from original perception primarily by the role of learning and experience. Here is Reid explaining how this happens in the case of perception of depth and three-dimensional figure by sight: It is experience that teaches me that the variation of colour is an effect of spherical convexity […]. Here is what Reid says concerning this: In acquired perception, the signs are either sensations, or things which we perceive by means of sensations.
General Considerations on Memory Memory, for Reid, is the perfect counterpart to perception: it is an original faculty of minds, which is meant to give beings endowed with it immediate access to the past. Here is what he says at the beginning of the Essay on memory: Things remembered must be things formerly perceived or known. This is because, according to Reid, apprehension, when employed by another faculty, such as perception and consciousness, is strictly related to the present moment: It is by memory that we have an immediate knowledge of things past: The senses give us information of things only as they exist in the present moment; and this information, if it were not preserved by memory, would vanish instantly, and leave us as ignorant as if it had never been.
To show that he is right, Reid discusses the now famous case of the brave officer: Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, which must be admitted to be possible, that when made a general he was conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of his flogging.
Due to this feature of identity, there is no way to think that mental states and processes remain identical over time: Hence we may infer, that identity cannot, in its proper sense, be applied to our pains, our pleasures, our thoughts, or any operation of our minds. Intellectual Powers Proper a. Conception The fourth Essay is dedicated to conception, whose primary role is to be an ingredient or concomitant in all other operations of the mind. Judgment and Reasoning Reid dedicates two essays to the mental powers of judgment and reasoning with which he believes human beings to be endowed by nature.
The Fundamental Characteristics of Judgment Reid talks about judging in terms of offering mental assent or dissent to the issues represented by any particular judgment. Without analyzing, abstracting, and judging when they reached correct conclusions, human beings would have been given reasoning in vain: [S]ome exercise of judgment is necessary in the formation of all abstract and general conceptions, whether more simple or more complex; in dividing, in defining, and in general, in forming all clear and distinct conceptions of things, which are the only fit materials of reasoning.
Reid believes that self-evident principles are at the foundation of any kind of knowledge and that common sense is the mental operation that discovers such principles for human beings: All knowledge, and all science, must be built upon principles that are self-evident; and of such principles, every man who has common sense is a competent judge, when he conceives them distinctly. Reid explains that reason and common sense do not conflict, because common sense is part of reason, just as judging does not oppose reason: We ascribe to reason two offices, or two degrees. First Principles of Common Sense Reid thus believes that human beings are endowed with a faculty that gives them immediate knowledge of self-evident principles.
It is the truths themselves that are either necessary or contingent: The truths that fall within the compass of human knowledge, whether they be self-evident, or deduced from those that are self-evident, may be reduced to two classes. Reasoning If the first principles of common sense are discovered by employing the operation of intuitive judging, reasoning proper is to be employed to discover whatever conclusions follow from self-evident principles.
Reid thinks that it would be superfluous to try to give several different demonstrations to prove one conclusion, while employing demonstrative reasoning, even though a variety of proofs may be available in practice: To add more demonstrations of the same conclusion, would be a kind of tautology in reasoning; because one demonstration, clearly comprehended, gives all the evidence we are capable of receiving.
To better understand this, consider the distinction that Reid draws between things internal and things external to the mind at the beginning of the EIP : When…we speak of things in the mind, we understand by this, things of which the mind is the subject. An Objectivist Account of Beauty Putting everything together, here is the picture that emerges: Reid believes that beauty is a property both of objects and of minds. References and Further Reading a. Primary Sources Hume, D. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Original work published in Hume, D. Edited by T. Green and T.
Hume considers whether there can be any objective standard of taste. Hutcheson, F. Edited by W. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Locke, J. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Reid, T. Edited by Derek R. Cited in text as IHM , chapter, section, page number. Cited in text as Essay , book, chapter, section number. Cited in text as EIP , essay, chapter, page number. Edited by Knud Haakonssen and James A. Secondary Sources Alston, W.
Matthews Eds. The Philosophy of Thomas Reid , pp. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Argues that conception, despite its name, does not involve the use of any concepts. Benbaji, H. Buras, T. Interprets Reid as saying that sensations are reflexive acts of the mind, taking themselves as objects.
Explains what function sensations perform: primarily, they give sentient beings information about how they react to the environment. Copenhaver, R. Aquinas writes that the soul, as form, is present in every part of the body—even the parts of the human body that move without our control. But it is particularly when intentional acts of the body, such as pointing or completing jig-saw puzzles, disclose immaterial realities of thought that we perceive this intimate union of body and soul more clearly.
Regarding moral knowledge, Anscombe shares with Aquinas a sense that we grasp the most basic of moral precepts or values through inclination or instinct. This sense of the mystical helps us see what is truly at stake with moral prohibitions. Hence, for Anscombe, the most important form of connatural moral knowledge is our sense of the dignity of human nature.
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No doubt, she speaks of other instances of connatural knowledge as well, such as reverence for the sexual act and the valuing of the knowledge of biological parenthood. What grounds our special dignity—and our knowledge of it—is none other than the nature of our body-soul union. On the contrary, they are intrinsically bound up with the goods of our rational or spiritual nature, such as love of God and of neighbor.
Not only does this mean the whole human being is imbued with a special dignity, it also means we do not learn of this dignity externally, as it were, via deductive arguments. An implication of the unity of body and soul is that we are inclined from within to value the goods towards which our bodily nature tends. Such connatural knowledge certainly does not render superfluous the cultivation of virtue. Following Wittgenstein, Anscombe explains that one way of understanding such an action is to look at its context. Does the person pointing possess the concepts of shape and color?
Is there something being accomplished in this context by pointing to shape, such as the teaching of a word? An intention is not necessarily an interior thought about what I hope to achieve through a particular action. An action is also intentional when it can be explained or interpreted by past history—for example, by the motive of revenge—or by context. An intention is therefore more like the underlying meaning of an action in the context of human institutions and history.
One must attend to both material and immaterial aspects of activities—what it means to supply someone goods, for instance, cannot be understood simply by observing physical facts, or by asking what interior thought accompanied the action. Tying intention too exclusively to interior thought would have grave consequences for ethics.
The institutional context, constituted by both material e. Man is spirit, but he is also body, and this truth has important implications for our lives. To search for the spiritual is not to look somewhere obscure, but to look at the everyday facts of human life, institutions, and history. Man and his actions cannot be understood as purely material—nor does he truly understand himself that way.
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